constitute the institutional structure or architecture of the federal government.
The difference between rights and structure within the overall Constitution is commonplace.3 For government to avoid violating an individual right is a matter of constitutional duty owed to each person within its jurisdiction. This duty is personal, running in favor of each rights holder. On the other hand, for government to avoid exceeding a structural restraint is a matter of confining legislation and the actions of its officials to the scope of its delegated powers. These restraints are impersonal, running in favor of the entire body politic. 4 Although individual rights can be waived because they are personal, institutional structure cannot. 5 The difference between rights and structure manifests itself in additional but often subtle ways that can prove definitive. 6 A structural clause, to be sure, often has a laudable effect on individual liberty by compelling various branches of the government (legis- In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the Framers was not so confined. They used the principles of [structure] to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from [individually] intrusive governmental acts. Ibid. at 449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)
at 702-03 (contrasting personal jurisdiction as an "individual liberty" that can be waived with structural restraints, such as limits on subject matter jurisdiction, that are a "restriction on ... power ... as a matter of sovereignty" and thus cannot be waived); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, (1998) at 449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that structural clauses cannot be voluntarily surrendered, yielded up, or abdicated by Congress). 6. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) (holding that the Dormant Commerce Clause is a rights-securing clause rather than a power-limiting clause of the Constitution, thus actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 providing for redress of rights deprivation); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) at 107-08 (holding that the Supremacy Clause is not a rights-securing clause but a power-allocating clause requiring that federal law prevail when there is a conflict with a law based on state power, thus not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 providing for redress of rights deprivation); ibid. at 116 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (distinguishing a constitutional right from "those interests merely resulting from the allocation of power" between governmental entities).
lative, executive, and judicial) to stay within their authority. 7 Nevertheless, the immediate object of constitutional structure is the management of power: a dividing, dispersing, and balancing of the various prerogatives of sovereignty. "Separation of powers" and "federalism" are mere shorthand for familiar forms of constitutional structure running horizontally and vertically, respectively, within the threebranch federal government and the multilayered system of national, state, and local governments. Structural clauses are helpfully thought of as power conferring and power limiting, so long as it is understood that many such clauses serve both functions.8
A "NEGATIVE" ON THE GOVERNMENT'S POWER
The Bill of Rights did not confer new powers on Congress. 9 The fears of the Anti-federalists, who were prominent in the First Congress, 7 . Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) at 921-22 (explaining how individual liberty flows consequentially from the Constitution's structure); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) at 552 (explaining how structure has the object of preventing the accumulation of excessive power in any single government or branch thereof, and the successful achievement of that diffusion of power consequentially ensures the protection of liberty). 8. The Commerce Clause, for example, both confers power on Congress (Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (upholding federally issued coasting license in the face of a state-granted steamboat monopoly)), and the Clause sets limits on that power (United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal law criminalizing mere possession of firearms near a school)). A structural clause can have this dual function because, as expressed in the Tenth Amendment, powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states or to the people. 9. In a speech before the House introducing his draft of the proposed amendments, James Madison described their purpose as follows: "the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." Annals of Congress 1, ed. Joseph Gales (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1789), 454. In The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870), the Supreme Court observed:
The preamble to the [congressional] resolution submitting [the Bill of Rights to the states] for adoption recited that the "conventions of a number of the states had, at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of [federal] powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added." .. . Most of [the proposed] amendments are denials of power which had not been expressly granted, and which cannot be said to have been necessary and proper for carrying into execution any other powers. Such, for example, is the prohibition of any laws respecting the establishment of religion, prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Ibid., 535. The Preamble in its entirety is reproduced at drove them to just the opposite objective: to deny ("negative") power to interfere with liberties that might otherwise be implied from the more open-ended delegations in the original Constitution. 1 0 The Federalists gave little resistance to this enterprise because their position all along had been that the new central government had never been delegated such powers." Indeed, James Madison, a Federalist and principal drafter of the Constitution proper, led the cause for a Bill of Rights. So Congress settled on the exact text of the proposed articles of amendment in late September 1789 with relative ease.
12 Twelve articles were submitted to the states, but only ten were ratified. 13 The ratified amendments were thought to change little, but they did calm the fears of citizens while serving as a useful hedge against possible future en- 13. Twelve articles of amendment were submitted to the states for ratification. The third of these articles contained the free exercise and no-establishment language. Only the third through the twelfth articles received the necessary approval by the states, thus the third article was denominated the "First Amendment." See generally, Levy, note 9, at 85-89 (discussing ratification debates in the states). The two failed articles of amendment, the first and second, concerned matters of structure. After languishing more than two centuries, interest revived in one of the "failed" articles of amendment and it was eventually ratified by the states in 1992 and is now denominated the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
croachments. Moreover, the Bill of Rights as a "negative" on congressional power was not altered when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.14 Nor was this "negative" on power turned into a grant 19. In the stream of Western civilization a structuralist Establishment Clause is the happy ending to a painful progression. In the early Middle Ages state and church, while organizationally distinct from one another, were part of a single whole. Man's moral vision derived from one source, and the state was legitimated by religious sanction. This unity of political polity and church membership was shattered by the Reformation of the sixteenth century. The resulting arrangement became state, established church, and religious dissenters. The latter were often persecuted, in large measure because the presence of dissenters within the political polity were thought to destabilize the state. Religious wars ensued in a failed attempt to restore the earlier unity. General exhaustion and abhorrence with the violence wrought by these wars, as well as the emerging influence of the Enlightenment, caused matters to evolve in the direction of limited state, established church, and toleration of dissenters. The final turn, uniquely American, occurred state-bystate during the period of disestablishment, roughly the 1780s to 1830s. The American settlement was a limited state, free churches, and voluntarism in matters of religion and the exercise thereof. Thus, matters of ecclesiastical cognizance were deregulated, no longer subject to the state's jurisdiction. The state, however, was not understood as conferring on the churches their freedom. Rather, the law presupposed and thus was simply acknowledging the autonomy of churches concerning affairs within the spiritual realm. This settlement was not, of course, one of state indifference to religion. Although foreswearing any claim to coercive power, the engagement of churches in public affairs by way of persuasion and influence continued to be expected and welcomed. and celebrated contribution to the American constitutional settlement. 20 The Establishment Clause can be a means of redress for individual harms, but only when the injury is other than religious in nature, such as economic harm or loss of property, 2 1 constraints on academic inquiry by teachers and students,22 or restraints on free-thinking atheists. z -Even in these situations, however, the no-establishment 20. Historian Sanford Cobb has observed that America's solution to the "world-old problem of Church and State" was "so unique, so far-reaching, and so markedly diverse from European principles as to constitute the most striking contribution of America to the science of government." Sanford Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902, reprint, New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968), vii. Republican government, being self-government or popular sovereignty, was believed to require a virtuous and self-disciplined people. Because survival of the state depended on civic virtue, government may properly assume a role in promoting that virtue. However, notithstanding that religion plays a vital role in training the people in virtuous living, the American constitutional settlement was to deny to the national government a role in promoting religion. Religion was no longer to be a tool of statecraft. Michael W. In Torcaso, an atheist who otherwise qualified for a public office refused to take a required oath that professed belief in God. The Court held the oath requirement violative of the First Amendment without specifying either religion clause. If an individual objects to the oath out of a religious belief that forbids principle is not transformed into an individual-rights clause with the assigned task of protecting, respectively, property, academic freedom, and freedom from religion. Rather, these injuries are remedied only consequentially to the operation of the Establishment Clause as it fulfills its structuralist role.2 In such a paradigm the no-establishment principle orders, even in the absence of individual harm, the respective competencies of government and religion. Legal historian Mark DeWolfe Howe concludes:
The First Amendment... would impose a disability upon the national government to adopt laws with respect to establishments whether or not their consequence would be to infringe individual rights of conscience.
To find this... purpose in the First Amendment involves, necessarily I think, the admission that the Amendment is something more than a charter of individual liberties.25
From time to time religious claimants have sought to enlist the Establishment Clause into serving as a rights-protecting clause, but the Supreme Court has rarely followed that course. In Larson v. Valente,2 6 the Court did apply the no-establishment principle to entertain a claim involving discrimination among religious groups and thus to redressed taking oaths, then he has a valid claim under the Free Exercise Clause. As an atheist, hovever, the claimant in Torcaso did not (indeed, by definition could not) suffer a religious injury as he professed to have no religious beliefs. Nevertheless, for a state to mandate taking of the oath would be a violation of the Establishment Clause as to all office seekers, including atheists, because confession of belief in a deity is a subject that remains in the realm of religion.
Atheists and agnostics are sensibly protected as well by the Free Speech Clause, for the rights implicated are freedom to believe and freedom to refrain from speaking. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), 156-57. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court found violative of free speech rights a law permitting censorship of films found to be "sacrilegious." The Court could have reached the same result under the Free Exercise Clause if the film producer sought to convey a religious belief, either about his own faith or a theological criticism of the faith of others. However, the Court also could have struck down the censorship law under the Establishment Clause and done so regardless of whether the film producer sought to convey a religious or secular message, for a no-establishment transgression does not have as its object the redress of personal religious injury. 24. The structuralist role in the three cases of Thornton, Edwards, and Torcaso (see notes 21-23), is to restrain government from preferring particular religious practices over secular concerns in the spheres of, respectively, commerce, science, and qualifications for government office. Preferences of this sort, if allowed to multiply without bound, can lead to a convergence of political factions and religious denominational loyalties. Such a convergence is bad for peace within the body politic, for in extreme instances such sectarian strife can breakout into violence and destabilize the state. allegations of religious harm. 27 But this was highly unusual2 and probably wrongheaded, for Larson could just as easily-and more sensibly-have been grounded in the Free Exercise Clause. 29 (1971) . In Gillette, the Court held that exemptions from the military draft for those religiously opposed to all war but not for those willing to fight in a "just war" was not intentionally discriminatory on the basis of religious affiliation and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause. Ibid. at 450-54. Hence, Gillette acknowledged no-establishment as a source of redress for religious harm caused by religious discrimination but then went on to hold that this particular claim was without merit. Larson is thus the only Supreme Court case where personal religious injury was redressed pursuant to the Establishment Clause. 29. It is more sensible to conceptualize a government's intentional discrimination between two religious groups as injurious to the disfavored religion. If that had been done in Larson, the Court could have decided the case under the Free Exercise Clause. In order to resolve Larson under the Establishment Clause, as the Court did, one has to envision the government's discrimination as unconstitutional not because it hindered the disfavored religion, but because the discrimination brought about a preference for competing religions. This framing of the claimant's injury is conceptually awkward. Official discrimination against a religion does have the potential of helping other religions, but then again it may turn out to be of no benefit to the competition. It would be better for the Court to focus on the harm to the victimized religion rather than to speculate about benefits to competing religions. The Court did proceed in the more logical fashion suggested here in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), holding ordinances that ostensibly regulated the killing of animals but whose real object was to inhibit the practices of a particular church, were violative of the Free Exercise Clause. 30. See notes 21-24.
The literature is often uneven when using the terms "religious freedom," "religious liberty," and "religious rights. 103-04. The common feature of individual rights and group rights is that in both instances there is no violation of a constitutional right in the absence of a showing of personal "injury in fact." The violation of a structural clause need not be so attended.
The term "group" is used in the sense of a collection of individuals with a common cause. When a group (association, institution, organization, society) is imbued with certain formalities, the government recognizes it as a jural entity. There are no Free Exercise Clause rights for a religious group over and above the aggregated individual rights of the entity's membership. However, the Establishment Clause with its role as a limit on governmental power, does afford religious groups institutional autonomy when acting on matters inherent to religion. See notes 48-52.
Some may be initially dismayed that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious organizations (beyond the aggregated rights of their members) in preserving the group's autonomy and religious character in the face of governmental intrusion. But, again, as will be seen below, religious organizations have such safeguards, but the safeguards are secured by the Establishment Clause. The well-meaning project to force such safeguards into the scope of the Free Exercise Clause under the banner of "accommodationism" has caused all manner of doctrinal confusion. 32. The Free Exercise Clause is violated when government enforces a restriction that intentionally discriminates against religion, religious practice, or against an individual because of his or her religion. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). However, a law's unintended discriminatory effect adverse to a religious belief or practice is not, without more, a free exercise violation. Oregon Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) .
A persistent minority of the justices on the Supreme Court indicate that they would go further and recognize Free Exercise Clause protection for disparate effects on religion. Compare, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) at 544-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Smith should be reconsidered), with ibid. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (defending Smith decision); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 570-71 (Souter, J., concurring) (Smith should be reconsidered). There is no need in this essay to take sides in the debate over whether Smith was correctly decided. Whatever the proper scope of the Free Exercise Clause, the one certainty is that the injury it redresses is in the nature of personal religious harm and nothing more. harms, to be sure, but not religious harms. 36 Religious harms are left to be remedied, if at all, as a by-product of the Establishment Clause keeping aright the spheres of government and religion. This is not to say that the Establishment Clause has nothing to do with religious liberty writ large, a matter taken up later in this essay. Structural clauses, as noted previously, do indirectly bear on the protection of individual rights, including religious rights. By delimiting and qualifying governmental sovereignty, structure often redounds to further secure personal rights. Conversely, although rights clauses have as their immediate purpose the protection of individual freedom, they have a consequential impact on governmental power. But this happy symmetry between structure and rights is no reason to conflate them. 37 The object of a structural clause is to set compensating checks on the powers of a modern nation-state, checks that must be honored whether or not individual complainants suffer concrete "injury in fact."m 3 Because the Establishment Clause is a structural clause rather The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses are unable, of course, to protect religious activity that has no appreciable expressional content. Concerning such activity, the Free Exercise Clause alone must be looked to as the source of constitutional protection from personal religious injury. Justice White, dissenting in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion), stated the matter well:
It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious classification. The Amendment protects belief and speech, but as a general proposition, the free speech provisions stop short of immunizing conduct from official regulation. The Free Exercise Clause, however, has a deeper cut: it protects conduct as well as religious belief and speech. Ibid. at 372. 37. See Akhil Reed Amar, 'The Bill of Rights as a Constitution," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1131. Professor Amar argues that constitutional rights also impose an organizational structure on government. Ibid. at 1132-33. The point in this essay, however, is that the structuring of government that comes from the enforcement of a rights clause is not the immediate object of the clause but derivative of it. Conversely, the protection of individual rights that comes from the enforcement of a structural clause is not the immediate object of the clause but derivative of it. Hence, the immediate object of enforcement of the Establishment Clause is not religious freedom, but religious freedom is derivative of it. 38. This is why federal taxpayers, without any shoving of personal "injury in fact," are sometimes granted special standing to pursue Establishment Clause claims challenging than a rights clause, it is vital that it be understood as such and be so applied.
THE CLAUSES-IN-CONFLIc'T FALLAcY
In the hands of the Supreme Court, then, the task of the Establishment Clause is independent of the Free Exercise Clause's protection of individual religious rights. Neither clause is subordinate or instrumental to the other. 39 Nor is there "tension" between the clauses, as if they sometimes pulled in opposite directions leaving it to the courts to "balance" one against the other and thereby having to choose between them. The clauses-in-conflict contention makes no sense. 40 39. Grammatically there is but one First Amendment clause (with two prepositional phrases) that explicitly concerns religion. The existence of a single Clause has been turned into an argument that one religion clause has but one purpose, and that purpose is the protection of individual religious freedom. Thus, it is argued, the no-establishment of religion is but a means to serve the free exercise of religion. The consequence, should the argument prevail, is that the rule of no-establishment becomes a tool in aid of free exercise. The claim that no-establishment does not operate separate and independent of free exercise leads not only to confusion, but-as implied in the text-has dire consequences for the law. The argument's adoption would lead not just to conflation of an individual right vith a structural restraint, but to destruction of the structuralist meaning of no-establishment. Notwithstanding the grammatical correction, the single religion clause consists of two prepositional phrases. Historically each prepositional phrase carried its own operative meaning, for both the Senate and House in the First Congress debated and amended the text of the first Clause of the First Amendment as having two independent phrases. See Walter Berns, "Religion and the Founding Principle," in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, 3" ed. (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1986), 204, 206-10 (making the point that freedom of conscience as embodied in the Free Exercise Clause was not opposed by anyone, but the ideas embodied in the Establishment Clause divided Congress over the role, if any, government had in fostering religion and, if there was a role, whether that role was entirely at the state level). 40. A casebook widely used in law schools supplies an all too common example of the "tension" argument:
The two clauses.., protect overlapping values, but they often exert conflicting pressures. Consider the common practice of exempting church property from taxation. Does the benefit conveyed by government to religion via that exemption constitute an "establishment"? Would the "free exercise" of religion be unduly burdened if church property were not exempted from taxation? Articulating satisfactory criteria to accommodate the sometimes conflicting emanations of the two religion clauses is a recurrent challenge in this chapter.
states it has primacy over the other) 41 nor are such conflicts inherent to the religion clauses and thereby logically unavoidable.42 Conflict is not possible, for each clause in its own way was a "negative" on powers that might have been implied from the original Constitution. Two "nega- 
A RESTRAINT ON GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT ALONE
Proper relations between religion and government (or "church and state") are codified in the text "make no law respecting an establishment of religion." This limitation casts the Establishment Clause in the role of boundary keeper. In setting out to locate that boundary, it is a useful reminder that the "keeper's" task is to restrain government, not private individuals, not churches, and not religion. Thus the role of the no-establishment principle is not to protect people from other people.
Nor is it to protect minority religions from majority religions. Nor is it to protect the nonreligious from the religious. Nor is it to protect the government from the churches. The Establishment Clause's sole object is to limit government, including, of course, to restrain government when it improperly allies with religion. Richard John Neuhaus writes: The religion clause of the First Amendment is entirely a check upon government, not a check upon religion. Even if a particular religion were to agitate successfully to have itself officially established, it is the government that would have to do the establishing. And that is what the government is forbidden to do. As wrongheaded as it would be, religions are perfectly free to agitate to have themselves established, for that too is part of religious freedom. What is prohibited by the First Amendment is the [use] of government power in giving in to such agitations.... The religion clause is not then, as some claim, a check upon both government and religion, nor is it a provision in which two clauses are to be "bal- . However, when a claimed "freedom from religion" is removed from the religion clauses as a constitutionally protected right, the supposed "tension" falls away. Such a move does not leave a claimed "freedom from religion" without constitutional protection. It does mean, however, that to the extent that the First Amendment does protect a "freedom from religion," it does so as a by-product of the structural restraint on governmental power found in the Establishment Clause.
anced" against one another. The religion clause is not to protect the state from the church but to protect the church from the state. Similarly, in press-state relations, the First Amendment is not to protect the state from the press but to protect the press from the state. The "great object" of the Bill of Rights, [James] Madison most explicitly said when introducing his draft to the House [of Representatives], was to 'limit and qualify the powers of Government." Jefferson were not mere tolerationists; they countenanced a constitutional solution to the religion question, renouncing the authority of the state to regulate the one aspect ofbehavior that had most disrupted the peace of society since the Reformation. For at the heart of their support or disestablishment and free exercise lay the radical conviction that nearly the entire sphere of religious practice could be safely deregulated, placed beyond the cognizance of the state, and thus defused as hoth a source of political strife and a danger to individual rights. 44 What still remains in play is not so much the task of maintaining a double-sided "wall of separation," as it is answering the question of where the boundary between government and religion lies and, hence, what individuals and religious groups may do on the sacerdotal side of this boundary free from government's interference with-as well as freedom from government's misplaced attempts to boost-religion.
The task thereby resolves itself down to a question of jurisdiction. As Professor Max L. Stackhouse aptly concludes: [ The First] amendment to the Constitution acknowledges the existence of an arena of discourse, activity, commitment, and organization for the ordering of life over which the state has no authority. It is a remarkable thing in human history when the authority governing coercive power limits itself.... However much government may become involved in regulating various aspects of economic, technological. medical, cultural, educational, and even sexual behaviors in society, religion is an arena that, when it is doing its own thing, is off limits. This is not only an affirmation of the freedom of individual belief or practice, not only an acknowledgment that the state is noncompetent when it comes to theology, it is the recognition of a sacred domain that no secular authority can fully control. Practically, this means that at least one association may be brought into being in society that has a sovereignty beyond the control of government 4 5 When government acts in excess of the Establishment Clause, religion may be helped or hindered. But any such act, whether it ends up helping or hindering religion, is a transgression of the clause.
Identification of the precise subject matters that fall within the meaning of the restraint on "making ... law respecting an establishment of religion" necessarily entails substantive choices. The boundary has been disputed for over two thousand years, 46 ("The task of separating the secular from the religious in education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy... It is idle to pretend that this task is one from which we can find in the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education.")
The Supreme Court has not left the lower courts, legislators, and litigants without guidance on the all-important question of boundary keeping. The cases indicate that government does not exceed the restraints of the Establishment Clause unless it is acting on topics that are inherently religious. The Supreme Court has found that prayer, 4 8
devotional Bible reading,4 9 veneration of the Ten Commandments,°c lasses in confessional religion, 5 1 and the biblical story of creation taught as science 52 are all inherently (or "exclusively") religious. Hence, by virtue of the Establishment Clause, these topics are off limits as objects of legislation or any other purposeful action by civil officials. Likewise, when government is called on to resolve doctrinal questions, or related matters bearing on ecclesiastical polity, clerical office, or church discipline and membership, these subject matters are outside the cognizance of government. ing the centrality of a particular belief or practice to a given religion. 5 Closely related to these case-by-case designations of what is inherently religious and what is "arguably non-religious," 56 is the rule that U.S. 263 (1981) at 269-70 n.6, 272 n.11 (holding that inquiries into significance of religious words or events are to be avoided); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) at 674 (holding that it is desirable to avoid entanglement that would follow should tax authorities evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare programs); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) at 305-07 (stating that petty officials are not to be given discretion to determine what is a legitimate "religion" for purposes of issuing a permit); see also Epinosa v. Rusk, 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (affd mem.) (striking down charitable solicitation ordinance that required officials to distinguish between "spiritual" and secular purposes underlying solicitation by religious organizations); United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S. 561 (1972) at 564-65 (per curiam) (holding that IRS could not appeal directly to Supreme Court the ruling of a federal district court to the effect that the IRS's redetermination of § 501(c)(3) exempt status was done in a manner violative of rights of an admittedly religious organization; district court had prevented IRS from examining all of religious organization's activities and characterizing them as either "religious" or "political" and, if political, then "non-religious"). . This is consistent with the rule that government can either treat all alike, not concerning itself with unintended effects, or government can purposefully lift civic burdens from individuals based on their religious practices. What is impermissible is to lift such burdens based on an individual's denominational or religious affiliation. 56. As one commentator put it, albeit in the context of discussing a different but related problem, some topics of legislation can be described as "arguably religious" for free exercise purposes but "arguably non-religious" for no-establishment purposes. See Tribe, American The constitutionality of legislation exempting religion from regulatory burdens and taxation6 also make sense from the perspective of a structuralist Establishment Clause, for these exemptions enhance and reinforce the desired separation of church and state. The Supreme Court has successfully avoided two mistakes when drawing the boundary between government and religion. First, the Court has not identified churches and other religious organizations (e.g., educational, charitable, and mission societies) and then assumed that religion is actually confined to those institutions. Churches and their affiliated ministries do not monopolize religion. Religiously grounded convictions and obligations show their influence in every area of life, not merely in church affairs. Hence, Establishment Clause violations can occur notwithstanding the complete absence of involvement by churches, mission societies, religious schools, and the like. 66 Second, the Supreme Court has not set out to separate government from all that could be said to be religious. Rather, the separation is of government from matters inherently religious. A separation of government from all that is religion or religious would result in a secular public square, one hostile to the public face of religion. The Founders intended no such regime. Historian Mark A. Noll writes:
[T]he founders' desire for the separation of the institutions of church and state reflected a desire to respect not only religion but also the moral choice of citizens. It was not a provision to remove religion as such from public life. In the context of the times it was more a device for purifying the religious impact on politics than removing it.
The authors of the [Constitution] seemed to be saying that religion and politics occupied two different "spheres." This was not secular in the modem sense.
[T]here was every expectation that Christian principles would continue to play a large role in strengthening the population and even in providing a moral context 64 for legislation. Yet the Constitution, without ever spelling it out precisely, nonetheless still acknowledges that the functions of government in society have a different role than the functions of religion. Both are important, and important to each other. But they are different. 67 There are extreme voices claiming for the Establishment Clause the ordaining of a new secular order,6s one that would thereby cabin religion in the "private" spaces of home and chapel. 69 Still others lament that the Court has promulgated a right to a freedom from religion. 70 But the cases will not bear either of these readings.
Various John M. Harlan said "that where the contested governmental activity is calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the competence of the State, and where the activity does not involve the State so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian," 72 then the constitutional restraint is not exceeded. As a final example, Justice Fe-lix Frankfurter sketched the no-establishment boundary in structuralist terms with these words: The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief. Congress may not make these matters, as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any legislature in this country.
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Each of these formulations will do, for they point to the same basic distinction between subject matters that are inherently religious and subjects that-while arguably religious-are grounded in the morals, the purpose and direction of the modern nation-state.
The first line of defense for the Supreme Court's position is that the Constitution's church-state boundary is the disestablishment settlement of the early nationhood period. As such, it is not to be tampered with under the guise of needed updating of "our living Constitution."
In the end, however, if the Court's government-religion boundary is to have staying power it has to be defended not because it is originalist or noncontroversial, but because it is good. Indeed, it is a three-fold good: it maximizes individual religious choice, protects the integrity of religion and religious organizations, and minimizes government-induced religious factionalism within the body politic. 75 In a representa-74. The structuralist settlement is a formal legal rule, but it is not substantively neutral. If it is objective law-making that is desired, the best a legal system can do is to pick a formal legal rule and then rigorously and dispassionately apply it without regard to the winners and losers in any fact-specific case that should later come before a judge. Such formal rules provide clarity and reduce judicial subjectivity. But the initial choice of a particular formal rule, necessarily rejecting competing rules, is a value-laden judgment that is in no sense substantively neutral. At bottom all claims of neutrality are a mask. See Garvey, "An AntiLiberal Argument," 290-91 (liberalism is not neutral, but makes "assumptions about human nature (the unencumbered self, the value of authenticity) that are inconsistent with convictions that many religious people hold"); Steven D. Smith, In a representative democracy there will always be factionalism along political lines. This is to be expected. But it is not desirable when religious denominations and political factionalism become one and the same. To the extent that government actions cause political factionalism and religious denominations (or similar creedal differences) to converge, such actions are of heightened concern to the Establishment Clause. This concern for avoidance of sectarian strife within the body politic was articulated in McGowan v. Manland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) at 430, in that "the establishment of a religion was equally feared because of its tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of civil authority." By denying governmental jurisdiction over inherently religious matters, the Establishment Clause has the object of protecting religious liberty writ large, i.e., the twin purposes five democracy, there will always be factionalism along political lines. It is not desirable, however, when religious denominations and political factions become one and the same, To the extent that governmental actions cause political factions and religious differences to converge, such actions are of heightened concern to the Establishment Clause. Thus, the Supreme Court, in Engel v. Vitale, made clear that the twin purposes of the Establishment Clause are to protect religion from the corrupting hand of government and to protect the government from being torn apart by sectarian strife. 7 6
Under the constitutional settlement, the Establishment Clause is not a silver bullet for winning (or ending) the culture wars. 77 Although the government-religion boundary-policed by the no-establishment principle--keeps government from taking sides on confessional and other inherently religious matters, moral and ethical questions have always been proper objects of legislation. Whose morality will dominate the Republic at any point in time, and hence will be reflected in the positive law of the nation, is not predetermined by the Establishment Clause. That determination is left for the making based on who has the more persuasive argument in the marketplace of ideas, as well as the organizational acumen to promote it.
of the Establishment Clause. Thus, the no-establishment principle is not an individual right from governmental intrusion, but a polity-wide liberty (the blessings of which favor the entire body politic) to a government that may not intermeddle in inherently religious matters. This fundamental difference between the individual freedom that derives from a constitutional right and the polity-wide liberty that derives from constitutional structure was noted by Justice Kennedy in the recent line item veto case:
So convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary.... In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the Framers was not so confined. They used the principles of separation of powers and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts. The idea and the promise were that when the people delegate some degree of control to a remote central authority, one branch of government ought not possess the power to shape their destiny without a sufficient check from the other two. In this vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to influence basic political decisions. 
